Direct, Indirect and Inferred Causation: Finite and Infinitive Complements of *Deixar* and *Fazer*

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Abstract

The present article examines the variation between finite and infinitive complements of the two Portuguese causation verbs deixar *and* fazer *from a cognitive perspective. It is argued that the difference between these complements is mainly semantic and that it can be explained by the notion of* linguistic iconicity, *i.e. the semantic differences can be seen in the formal differences. Accordingly, a minor formal distance between the main verb and the complement verb in the infinitive complements signals a prototypically direct causation. On the other hand, a greater distance in the finite complements implies an indirect causation. Further, it is claimed that the indirect causation is often of an inferential and more complex character, thus giving rise to a higher degree of* subjectification *in the finite complements than in the infinitive complements.*

1. Introduction

The aim of the present article is to address the variation between finite and infinitive complements of the two causation verbs *deixar* and *fazer* in European Portuguese, using as a point of departure a Cognitive Grammar perspective (Langacker, 1987, 1991). It is a well known fact that Portuguese, as well as many other Romance languages, allows different types of complement structures with these verbs. The main interest of this study is the variation between the finite structure with the verb in the subjunctive mood and the structure with the plain or the inflected infinitive:

***J*ournal of *P*ortuguese *L*inguistics, 7-1 (2008), 23-50** ISSN 1645-4537

(1) Além disso, não nos podemos esquecer que a escola está subjugada aquele pavilhão, porque não nos **deixam construir** um na escola», diz a professora. [*Linguateca*: Diário de Leiria-N3489-2][1]

(2) Às vezes as pessoas **deixam que os mesmos problemas as tornem** infelizes por anos... [http:// oquehahoje.blogspot.com/]

(3) Aos 33 minutos, Bruno num pontapé de ressaca **faz a bola sair** rente ao poste. [*Linguateca*: Viana Diário-N0901-1]

(4) Temos que arranjar maneira de obter mais receitas e achamos que este é o modelo que **faz com que a comunicação social dê** mais atenção à Taça da Liga. [*Linguateca*: Diário de Aveiro-N1581-1]

Traditionally, there has been a strong tendency within Portuguese linguistics towards studying the variation between these structures from a formal or generative perspective (cf. Raposo, 1975, 1981, 1987; Caetano Silveira et al., 1994; Brito, 1995; Matos, 2006). In these studies, a major concern has been to describe the grammatical contexts that allow this variation, and to postulate transformations, principles or specific rules in order to explain the occurrence of different complement structures. Less attention has been given to the semantic differences between these complement structures.[2]

In other words, although a formalistic approach may describe the structural properties of complementation, the semantic considerations have been rather neglected. Therefore, the current paper seeks to demonstrate that the occurrence of the structures *main verb + finite complement* and *main verb + infinitive complement* is motivated by semantic considerations and that these structures can be explained by the notions of *iconicity* and *subjectification*. Starting with the notion of iconicity, the main point is that the semantic differences between finite and infinitive complements can be explained by the following two iconic principles: (1) QUANTITY PRINCIPLE: formal complexity tends to correspond to conceptual complexity, (2) PROXIMITY PRINCIPLE: formal distance tends to match with conceptual

[1] The natural examples in this article are from the corpora *Linguateca* and from Portuguese Internet pages.

[2] An exception to this tendency is found in Silva (2004, 2005). Analysing finite and infinitive complements of *fazer* and *deixar* from a Cognitive Grammar perspective, Silva suggests that the finite structures exhibit a more explicit causation, and that a human subject in the finite structures implies a more premeditated causation. Silva's analysis is not necessarily at odds with the one pursued in the present paper. However, this is a complex and subtle issue that remains open for further investigation.

distance (cf. Haiman, 1980, 1985; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 127-129; Kortmann, 1997: 15).[3]

Relating these iconic principles to finite and infinitive complements of *deixar* and *fazer*, it is easy to verify that the structure *main verb + conjunction + finite complement* renders a higher degree of formal complexity than does the structure *main verb + infinitive complement*. In addition, the conjunction *que/com que* in the finite complements increases the formal distance between the main verb and the complement verb. The absence of this conjunction in the structure *verb + infinitive complement*, on the other hand, implies a minor distance between the linguistic units. As a result of these formal differences, the infinitive complements would also be of a lesser conceptual complexity than the finite ones. Furthermore, they would exhibit a minor conceptual distance from the main verb. This is the claim made in the present paper.

At least two questions arise from this discussion: In which way does conceptual distance matter? And, in which way are the finite complements conceptually more complex than the infinitive ones? Regarding the first issue, it is the claim of this paper that a minor formal distance between the infinitive complement and its main verb prototypically reflects a *direct causation*, and that a greater formal distance (attested in the finite ones) reflects a typically *indirect causation*.[4] The second question is closely related to the difference between direct and indirect causation. The hypothesis is put forth that indirect causation tends to imply an inferential process in the conceptualizer (the speaker), a type of causation that is conceptually more complex than the direct causation. This type of causation will be referred to as *inferred causation*.

Inferred causation leads to the notion of subjectification, i.e. some facet of the linguistic expression is realigned to the communicative event (cf. Langacker, 1990). In other words, inferred causation is of a more abstract type, where the conceptualizer construes a causal relation between two events that need not be related in the outside world.[5] In fact, it is the conceptualizer who relates two different events by inferring a causal relation between them. Thus, inferred causation differs radically from direct causation, which is prototypically of a more physical and/or visual-emotional character.

The article is organized in the following way: the notions of iconicity and subjectification will be discussed in 1.1. and 1.2. respectively, whereas section 1.3. comments upon the distinction between direct and indirect causation. In

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[3] The terms *semantic* and *conceptual* and their derivates will be given roughly the same meaning. From a Cognitive Grammar perspective, linguistic analysis is about meaning, which is equated with conceptualization (Langacker, 1987).

[4] At this point, it should be stressed that from a cognitive approach to language, causation is primarily studied in relation to a conceptualizer and his way of conceptualising a causal relation. This view is clearly at odds with the objectivist tradition, in which causation – and causal relations – are understood as objective features in the outside world (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).

[5] The term *event* will be used broadly, indicating an action, a process or a state (cf. Silva, 2004)

2., the finite and infinitive complements will be analysed in view of the distinction between direct and indirect causation (2.1.) and the notion of inferred causation (2.2.). Subsequently, in 2.3., the relation between inferred causation and subjectification will be analysed. The conclusions will be presented in 3.

1.1. Iconicity

It is a well known fact that any given language consists of signs that do not necessarily resemble the referent that they designate. The relation between the sign and its referent is in most cases arbitrary. From a Cognitive Grammar perspective, the relation between a sign and the referent is understood as a symbolic relation between a semantic pole and a phonological pole, i.e. the linguistic expression (cf. Langacker, 1987: 77). In view of this fact, it may seem contradictory to claim that languages are iconic in character.

Nonetheless, this apparent contradiction may be solved by the notion of *diagrammatic iconicity*. As Haiman (1980: 515) eloquently points out, there are at least two types of iconicity: *imagic* and *diagrammatic*. An iconic image shares a certain resemblance with its referent; prototypical cases would be a statue, a photograph or – in the case of languages – onomatopoeic words. An iconic diagram, on the other hand, is a systematic arrangement of signs that do not resemble their referent, but whose relationship with each other reflects the relationships of their referents. Put another way, a diagram need not resemble the concept that it represents, but there is a correspondence in the sense that each sign in the diagram represents a specific part of the concept. In the same way, linguistic symbols do not need to share any resemblance with the concept they represent. Still, the way we organize the linguistic symbols (the grammar) may be iconic: every symbol has a counterpart in the concept that it represents (cf. Haiman, 1985).

In relation to the notion of diagrammatic iconicity, Haiman (1985) presents two hypotheses. The first, called *the isomorphism hypothesis*, states a one to one correspondence between a linguistic sign and its referent. The second, known as *the motivation hypothesis*, states that the formal differences between two contrasting forms always reflect their semantic differences:

> **The Isomorphism Hypothesis**
> Different forms will always entail a difference in communicative function. Conversely, recurrent identity of form between different grammatical categories will always reflect some perceived similarity in communicative function.
>
> **The Motivation Hypothesis**
> Given two minimally contrasting forms with closely related meaning, the difference in their meaning will correspond to the difference in their form (Haiman, 1985: 19-20).

Obviously, the isomorphism hypothesis rejects the idea of full synonymy. Although many linguistic signs share semantic features, they will always entail some differences in communicative function. One example of this is the occurrence of different words designing a person with the feature [+ female/+ young] in Portuguese. Certainly, the words *menina*, *garota*, *miúda* and *rapariga* signal some communicative differences with respect to how we perceive the referent. It is also interesting to note that the second part of the isomorphism hypothesis may account for cases of polysemy – in cases where a form has more than one meaning, it is most likely that these meanings are related in some way.

In addition, the motivation hypothesis establishes a relation between linguistic forms and diagrams. That is to say, if each part of a diagram represents a certain part of a concept, it is also very likely that each part of a linguistic form represents a certain part of a conceptualization. Consequently, a difference in form between two minimally contrasting linguistic expressions will correspond to their different meanings.

The notion of diagrammatic iconicity is moreover present in Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and the metaphor [LINGUISTIC UNITS ARE CONTAINERS]. This metaphor precedes the two expectations *more of form is more content* and *closeness is strength of effect*. The first expectation is an iconic relation in which the addition of linguistic units correlates with more content, while the second one is a relation between formal and conceptual distance. Let us consider some examples from Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 127-129):

(5) He ran.

(6) He ran and ran and ran and ran.

(7) Mary doesn't think he will leave until tomorrow.

(8) Mary thinks he won't leave until tomorrow.

The semantic difference between (5) and (6) is rather obvious. The sentence "He ran" in (5) indicates that *the trajector* was involved in the action of running, and would be considered as an "unmarked" case of indicating this kind of activity. [6] On the other hand, the reduplication of the verb in (6) implies an extended activity, i.e. that the participant ran considerably more

[6] In accordance with the terminology of Cognitive Grammar, the term *trajector* will be used. This term is applied instead of the category *subject* in traditional grammar, and is given a high degree of prominence in a predicative relation as its focal participant. In prototypical cases, the trajector coincides with the semantic roles of agent, mover or experiencer. Another prominent participant is denominated the *landmark* and is often equated with the category direct object in traditional grammar (cf. Langacker, 1987, 1999).

than in example (5). In the following example (7), the negative transportation places the negative further away from the predicate that it logically negates (leave) than in (8). This negative transportation is said to have the effect of creating a weaker kind of negation (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 129).

Another iconic relation, cited in Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Langacker (1987), is exemplified by the way in which the formal distance between cause and effect correlates with a greater conceptual distance:

(9) Sam killed Harry.

(10) Sam made Harry die.

(11) Sam caused Harry to die.

(12) Sam brought it about that Harry died.

In these examples, a successively greater formal distance between the causal predicate and the one of effect tends to signal a more indirect (or diffuse) causation. In (9), for instance, the juxtaposition SN + V + SN signals a prototypically direct causal relation, while, in (12), the greater distance between these linguistic units implies an indirect one. Langacker (1987) explains the differences in the following way: "Such paradigms indicate that greater phonological distance between a predication of cause and one of effect correlates with greater conceptual distance in the domains of cause-effect linkages" (Langacker, 1987: 181).

To summarize, the notion of iconicity rests on the assumption that linguistic forms and structures can be understood as diagrams. Thus, the isomorphism hypothesis posits a one to one correspondence between form and meaning, and the motivation hypothesis defends the idea that formal differences reflect semantic ones. If we relate these hypotheses to finite and infinitive complements of *deixar* and *fazer*, the result would be that these complements cannot be regarded as synonymous. Firstly, one form corresponds to one meaning. Secondly, the formal differences will reflect some conceptual differences.

1.2. Subjectification

Traugott (1989, 1995, 1996) and Langacker (1990, 1999, 2003, 2006) are probably the two most prominent elaborators of the notion of subjectification in current linguistic theory. Although their theoretical frameworks share many ideas concerning this notion, they present two rather different ways of understanding it. [7]

[7] See Athanasiadou, Canakis and Cornillie (2006) for a detailed examination on this matter.

Traugott (1989, 1995, 1996) focuses on the diachronic aspect of subjectification, where it is understood as "the historical pragmatic-semantic process whereby meanings become increasingly based in the speaker's subjective belief state or attitude towards what is said…" (Traugott, 1996: 185). In other words, the notion of subjectification is very much equated with the speaker's subjective judgement about what is said. The path of semantic change to a higher degree of subjectivity involves three tendencies, summarized in Figure 1:

Tendency 1: Meanings based in the external described situation > meanings based in the internal (evaluative, perceptual, cognitive) described situation.

Tendency 2: Meanings based in the external or internal described situation > meanings based in the textual and metalinguistic situation.

Tendency 3: Meanings tend to become increasingly based in the speaker's subjective belief/state toward the proposition.

Figure 1. Semantic change towards subjectification.

An example of Tendency 1 is the early Old English *felan*, which only had the meaning of "touch" and did not acquire a perceptual meaning until late Old English; a change that implies a shift from an external and concrete domain to an internal and abstract domain. Tendency 2 can be seen in the semantic shift of the verb *observe* that has changed from being a purely mental verb (describing an internal situation) to be used as a speech-act verb, i.e. "state that". Finally, Tendency 3 is exemplified with the shift of the temporal adverb *while* into a concessive, and the development of the action verb *go* to have a temporal meaning of immediate planned future (cf. Traugott, 1989: 34-35).

Langacker (1990), analysing subjectification mainly from a synchronic point of view, defines this notion as "the realignment of some relationship from the objective axis to the subjective axis" (Langacker, 1990:13). This definition relates to the asymmetry between *the ground* and the object of conception as a matter of *construal* and *perspective*, dimensions that include notions like *vantage point* and *viewing arrangement*. The term ground is used for the speech event, i.e. the speaker, the hearer and the time and place of speaking. The ground is subjectively construed when it is left "offstage" as an unprofiled facet of the speaker's conceptualization. The subjective axis runs between the ground and the object of conception. The object of conception (in the objective axis) is said to be objectively construed if it is well delimited

from the ground, like in the case of finite clauses. Nonetheless, some part of the relation in the object of conception might realign to the subjective axis. Langacker (1990: 18) exemplifies this with the verb *go* and its different meanings:

(13) She is going to close the door .

As already mentioned above, cases like (13) are ambiguous and entail two different readings. On the one hand, they describe an objectively construed situation where the trajector (she) is moving along a path in order to close the door. On the other hand, in a temporal reading, there is no physical movement in order to carry out the infinitival process. The only movement recognized is the mental scanning of the participant who situates the process in relation to a reference time, i.e. the conceptualizer. Therefore, it is argued, the temporal reading consists of realignment from the objective axis to the subjective axis, and to subjectification. One important condition is that the ground is subjectively construed and remains "offstage".

In later works, Langacker (1999, 2006) has redefined the notion of subjectification as semantic "bleaching" or "fading away". The subjectively construed entity (the ground) is there all along, as a vestige of the objectively construed conception, and emerges – or becomes more evident – when the object of conception "is no longer there to mask it" (Langacker, 2006: 21). In other words, the mental scanning of the ground is constantly present, but becomes more obvious when the described situation lacks objective movement. Let us consider two examples from Langacker (2006: 22), illustrating two different senses of *across*:

(14) A giant chicken marched angrily across the street.

(15) There is a KFC outlet across the street.

The first example (14) describes an objectively construed situation where the trajector successively occupies all the positions indicated by the prepositional phrase "across the street". Evidentially, the ground is also scanning this situation as it occurs as an "offstage" participant of the objective scene. In (15), however, there is no longer any objectively construed movement. The trajector (KFC) is occupying a single location, i.e. the end of the path described by "across the street". The only thing that is "moving" is the ground, which is scanning mentally along the path in order to localize the KFC outlet. The difference between (14) and (15) is illustrated in Figure 2:



Figure 2. Subjectification of *across* (cf. Langacker, 2006: 23).

Consequently, in the moving sense of *across*, illustrated in (A), the ground (G) scans the objective scene, i.e. the movement of the trajector that is crossing the street. The movement of the trajector is illustrated by the connected circles that traverse the landmark (the street). By contrast, there is no physical movement to be scanned in the static sense of *across*. The objective scene lacks motion. That is to say, the objective movement in (A) has been replaced by subjective movement in B. It is the conceptualizer, as subject of conception (the ground), that mentally scans along the path with the intention of locating the trajector (the KFC outlet). As Athanasiadou, Canakis and Cornillie (2006: 3) point out, this shift constitutes a change in the locus of activity. It is now the conceptualizer, and not the trajector, who is the active participant. This feature, also termed *attenuation* in Langacker's framework, constitutes a fundamental trait of subjectification, namely a loss of subject control and a shift in domain from an active subject (the trajector) to the conceptualizer (cf. Langacker, 1999).

Although Langacker and Traugott approach subjectification from different theoretical frameworks, they share some common insights. For example, Langacker (2006) points out that the semantic shift of the English main verbs (for example, *may*, *will* and *must*) into modals – a case of subjectification in both frameworks – is a typical example of internalisation where meaning becomes based in the speaker's personal beliefs; and this certainly corresponds to Tendencies 1 and 3 in Traugott's framework. Nevertheless, Langacker emphasizes that a fundamental difference between the two frameworks is that Traugott examines subjectification in the domain of

conceptual content, while he approaches subjectification by taking into account the internal conceptual structure of an expression and its individual elements (cf. Langacker, 2006: 17-21).

This difference seems to elucidate a terminological matter. Traugott uses the term *subjective* in the sense of a speaker's way to express personal opinions towards a given situation, which is contrasted with objective reporting. This would explain why she says that the selection of the first--person subject form in the expression *I think* increases the degree of subjectification (cf. Traugott, 1995: 38). It seems as though Langacker admits that this feature, i.e. a higher degree of speaker involvement, may reflect a higher degree of subjectification, but for him the term *subjective construal* means that an entity is "offstage, as an implicit, unselfconscious subject of conception" (Langacker, 2006:18).

In the present study, both approaches to subjectification will be considered. In the first place, it is very likely that Tendency 1 and Tendency 3 in Traugott (1989) are relevant features in the variation between finite and infinitive complements of the Portuguese verbs *deixar* and *fazer*. This will be attested in a higher degree of internalization and personal beliefs in the finite complements than in the infinitive ones. In the second place, the claim made in this paper is that finite complements in many cases are inferential and that this feature indicates that a subjectively construed conceptualizer is mentally scanning (or creating) a situation that does not actually need to take place in the outside world.

1.3. Direct and indirect causation

The distinction made between direct and indirect causation frequently refers to that between physical manipulation with a high degree of control over the causee, on the one hand, and mental causation of an inducing, permissive or enabling kind, on the other hand (cf. Shibatani, 1976; Kemmer and Verhagen, 1994; Shibatani, 2002; Shibatani and Pardeshi, 2002). As a consequence of this distinction, Shibatanti and Pardeshi (2002: 89) point out that direct causation tends to reflect a situation in which the causee is patientive, while the opposite is more likely in indirect causation. In these cases, the causee is said to be agentive.

This claim is also made explicit by Verhagen and Kemmer (1997) and Song and Wolff (2004). The former define indirect causation as "a situation that is conceptualised in such a way that it is recognized that *some other force* besides the initiator is the *most* immediate source of energy in the effected event" (Verhagen and Kemmer, 1997: 67). In fact, this definition seems to be a point of departure for Song and Wolff (2004) who introduce the *no--intervening criteria* in which the causation is direct if there is no intervening causer between the initial causer and the final patient.

Another trait, discussed in Song and Wolf (2004), is the degree of intention of the caused event. This trait is exemplified with the difference

between "the girl broke the vase" and "the girl caused the vase to break". In the former case, the caused event is claimed to be an intended result; and therefore it signals direct causation. By contrast, the latter case represents a non-intended causation, and correlates with indirect causation (cf. Song and Wolff, 2004: 240-241). Figure 3 summarizes the distinctions discussed above:



Figure 3. Direct and indirect causation.

Relating the parameters in Figure 3 to the Portuguese causation verb *fazer*, they seem to correlate extremely well with a situation where one participant "does" something to another participant:

(16) O Jorge **faz o João sair** do restaurante. [verb + infinitive complement]

(17) O Jorge **faz com que o João saia** do restaurante. [verb + finite complement]

In a situation where "o Jorge" pushes "o João" out of the restaurant it is likely that (16) is more appropriate than (17) to code the event. Hence, the structure with an infinitive complement seems to correlate with a physical and direct causation. Further, this direct causation implies a patientive causee as well as a high degree of control and intention. On the other hand, if the two participants meet in a restaurant and "o Jorge" bores "o João" with his constant grumbling about things, "o João" may decide to leave the restaurant in order to escape from this grumbling. This situation could easily be coded by a finite complement, and would also include an agentive causee, a non--intentional causation and a minor degree of control over the caused event.

Another support for a correspondence between finite and infinitive complements, on the one hand, and direct and indirect causation, on the other, is found in Silva (2005). In fact, it seems that examples like: "?? O Zé faz com que/deixa que a Maria parta neste momento" have a minor acceptance in Portuguese. This minor acceptance could easily be explained by taking into

consideration that an expression that signals temporal contiguity (‘neste momento´) is not compatible with a structure that expresses two different events, i.e. the structure *main verb + finite complement*.

Nevertheless, the distinctions made in Figure 3 may be troublesome. In fact, one problem arises with the dichotomy between *intentional* and *non--intentional* causation. In (17), for example, it is not difficult to imagine that “o Jorge” is actually trying to get rid off his companion and therefore bores him intentionally in order to achieve the caused event of “o João” leaving the restaurant. Another problem is related to the distinction made between *physical*/*mental*, and the claim that mental causation always implies a loss of control. Certainly, it is true that physical and direct causation tends to correlate in a rather straightforward way, but the question is whether mental causation always has to be indirect and imply a lack of control over the caused event. This question is highly relevant in relation to the permissive/enabling causation, expressed by the verb *deixar*:

(18) O pai **deixa o seu filho comprar** gelado. [verb + infinitive complement]

(19) O pai **deixa que o seu filho compre** gelado. [verb + finite complement]

A first approximation to these examples seems to highlight a difference in physical closeness to the event of “buying ice-cream”. In fact, (18) is very well suited to describe an ongoing situation: someone can see the father handing over money to his son in front of the ice-cream stand and is commenting on this event. By contrast, the father might not even be present in (19). Seeing the son in front of the ice-cream stand, someone might come to the conclusion that his father – absent in the scene – lets him buy ice-cream on his own (cf. Perini, 1977: 94-95). This difference may very well reflect the distinction between direct and indirect causation.

Turning to the question of mental causation and control, this correlation seems to be more closely related to inducive mental causation than to the permissive/enabling kind. In the inducive type, a mind-to-mind relation emerges in the sense that the causer tries to change the world-view of the causee. And as Verhagen and Kemmer (1997: 71) point out: “one cannot reach into another person’s mind and directly cause him or her to do, feel, or think something”. But this is not actually the case with the permissive/ enabling causation. In examples like (18) and (19) the son already wants to buy an ice-cream and the father has the control of either letting him do so or not. [8] In terms of causative control, then, the difference between these examples is that the father does not know when and where the son is buying

[8] See Silva (1999, 2003) for an in-depth discussion of the semantic meaning of *deixar*.

his ice-cream in (19), a fact that gives a lesser degree of control over the caused event.

What examples like (18) and (19) reveal is that the distinction between direct and indirect causation made in Figure 3 is not to be seen as an absolute categorisation. Indeed, it seems to cover many prototypical cases, but there are still cases that are problematic. Therefore, terms like *physical*, *mental*, *agentive*, *patientive*, *control* (and others) will be considered as possible manifestations of a more basic parameter, put forth by Shibatani (2002) and Shibatani and Pardeshi (2002). These scholars suggest a spatiotemporal parameter that distinguishes whether a causal event is conceptualized as one single or two events. Figure 4 illustrates this difference:



A. Direct causation B. Indirect causation

C = causer
c = causee

Figure 4. Direct and indirect causation (cf. Shibatani & Padeshi, 2002: 90).

Shibatani and Pardeshi (2002) argue that the distinction between direct and indirect causation prototypically correlates with that between an agentive and a patientive causee.[9] The distinction is motivated by the idea that the execution of the caused event is utterly dependent on the causer when the causee is patientive, and that this entails a spatiotemporal overlap. Although this argument seems rather convincing, it raises some interpretative difficulties regarding the terms *agentive* and *patientive*. This difficulty is apparent in cases of direct causation like "a stone in the garden made him stumble and fall". In this case it is neither really convincing to say that the stone is agentive and wholly responsible for the caused event – nor, that the causee is totally patientive.

Finally, the distinction made between direct and indirect causation in Figure 4. might also entail the nature of the caused event. For example, if the caused event is direct and momentarily, like in the case of a tree falling, the

[9] The original Figure does not include the terms *causer* and *causee*, but the semantic roles *agent* and *patient*.

causation is more likely to be conceptualized as a direct one. On the other hand, if the caused event is a durative process (i.e. a ship that is sinking or the event of a beach being polluted), the causing event is often of a more diffuse kind and the causation can easily be conceptualized as an indirect one.

In the analysis that follows, it will be argued that the distinction between direct and indirect causation may be seen in different syntactical constructions, i.e. in the infinitive and finite complements of *deixar* and *fazer*. It will also be argued that this difference is closely related to verbal semantics. The infinitive complement, lacking the feature [tense], is more dependent on the main verb than are the finite complement and therefore the structure *main verb + infinitive complement* designates a complex event. The structure *main verb + finite complement*, by contrast, will denote two different events. In this sense, the causation expressed by these different structures will correspond to Figure 4a and 4b, respectively.

2. Analysis

2.1 Direct and indirect causation

As pointed out in 1.3, the distinction made between direct and indirect causation in Figure 3 is to be understood as reflecting prototypical properties of one or another kind of causation. Even if this comment underscores the idea that the categorization is not absolute, it is noteworthy to see that a physical direct causation often seems to be coded with an infinitive complement. Nonetheless, it is also interesting to consider some cases of direct causation that do not share these physical properties:

(20) Em plena rua Ivens, em Lisboa, uma jovem **deixa cair** uma pasta cheia de papéis em frente de outra jovem [http://www.seleccoes.pt/Revista/detalhe.asp?tipo=detalhe&área=16&ID=5632&Grupo=77]

(21) Monteiro, na cobrança de um livre directo, **fez o esférico entrar** nas redes à guarda de Pedro [*Linguateca*: Diário de Coimbra-N2890-1]

(22) Durante a manhã, os sequestradores, adeptos da oposição ao regime talibã dominante no Afeganistão, **deixaram sair** dois homens, uma mulher e duas crianças [*Linguateca*: Diário de Coimbra-N2191-1]

(23) Apesar disso, Nuno Valente concorda que o regresso ao sistema de quatro defesas «**faz a equipa estar** melhor e isso é o mais importante de tudo». [*Linguateca:* Diário de Leiria-N1800-2]

It is probably not too hazardous to claim that the first examples (20-21) describe events that are understood as prototypical cases of direct causation of a physical kind. In (20), the trajector (*uma jovem*) looses the grip of her folder. As a consequence of her action, the folder directly obeys the laws of gravitation and begins to fall. In the second example (21), "Monteiro" shoots a free kick that passes the goal keeper and enters the goal. In other words, there is directness in which the trajector physically manipulates the ball to move in a certain direction. As a result of this manipulation, the ball keeps on moving and enters the goal at the end of that path.

The following examples, however, diverge from the direct physical causation witnessed in (20-21). In the first case (22), the trajector (os sequestradores) releases the hostages from their captivity. In the other case (23), the return to a specific system leads to an improvement of the team. In these cases, it is tempting to make an indirect interpretation that refers to the mental side of causation. On the other hand, it is very likely that the hostages in (22) are not induced to leave their captivity, but rather seek it. Thus, the removal of a "barrier" automatically and directly allows them to achieve freedom.

Likewise, it could be argued that the return to an old system in (23) is a decision that is made earlier than the actual use of the system. This argumentation would entail two different events: the decision and the use. But, this is not actually the case. The application of the system takes place during a football match. During the same match, the conclusion is drawn that the system improves the team. Certainly, this implies a spatiotemporal overlap between the causing and the caused event – and direct causation.

The question regarding a correspondence between mental and indirect causation discussed in the examples above is also present in cases where the caused event is of a visual or emotional type. In these cases, it might be tempting to claim that the causing and the caused event are distinguishable, i.e. the causing event sets off a mental process that leads to the caused event. Let us consider some examples:

(24) …com enormes janelas, que (…) **deixam os olhos apreciar** toda a beleza e força do mar [http://www.netmenu.pt/rest_ficha.asp?RID=1108]

(25) A emoção marcou-nos a todos e não foram poucos os que **deixaram verter** uma lágrima de saudade bem portuguesa. [*Linguateca:* Diário de Aveiro-N4245-10]

(26) O primeiro dente, o primeiro cocó e xixi no bacio, as primeiras palavras, os primeiros passos e tudo o que **faz os pais orgulharem-se** dos filhos [http://www.jornaldeleiria.pt/index.php?article=7186&visual =2]

In (24) the mental process could be described in terms of a positive evaluation of a view. This evaluation is caused by the fact that a certain room has big windows. In other words, the windows "let" someone appreciate the beauty and power of the sea. In (25), some kind of event leads to an emotional and shared moment of shedding tears. Finally, the parents in (26) experience an emotion of pride by witnessing events that are connected to early childhood. What these cases seem to share is the notion of a mental process in the causee that leads to the caused event. Thus, it might be concluded that the infinitive complements exposed in (24-26) code indirect causation by means of describing events that do not overlap temporally with the causing event.

However, there is a shared conception that feelings may have the same effect as a "punch in the stomach". In the same way, perceptual events are often conceptualized as direct ones, because "we think that we see what we see because it is there, within our visual field, in the outside world; and we cannot avoid perceiving it if it is there" (Verhagen and Kemmer, 1997: 72). In this line of thought, it is interesting to note that examples (24-26) find an explication that covers direct causation in *the folk model of the mind* and the notion that perception and emotion represent direct and uncontrollable events while acts of thinking and believing, on the other hand, are understood as indirect mental processes that are controllable (cf. D' Andrade, 1987: 117--119).

Examples (20-26) confirm a correspondence where direct causation is coded by an infinitive complement. Even so, one may ask if the insertion of a structure with a finite complement alters the way in which the causation might be conceptualized. Consequently, it is elucidating to transform some examples studied above to finite complements and in this manner verify if this produces some conceptual differences. The cases exposed below are modifications of examples (21-22), this time with a finite complement:

(27) Monteiro, na cobrança de um livre directo, **fez com que o esférico entrasse** nas redes à guarda de Pedro.

(28) Durante a manhã, os sequestradores **deixaram que saíssem** dois homens, uma mulher e duas crianças.

In fact, the finite complement in (27) makes it hard to imagine that this case involves direct physical causation. By contrast, it seems more appropriate to code a situation where "Monteiro" contributes to the goal in an indirect manner. If he, for example, prevented the goalkeeper from reaching the ball and thereby contributed to the goal, this situation would probably be coded by (27), and not by the original case with an infinitive complement, i.e. "Monteiro fez o esférico entrar nas redes". The latter is certainly more fitting to code direct physical causation. Turning to (28), this example gives rise to

several interpretations. One is that there does not need to be any spatiotemporal overlap between the causing and the caused event. That is, the causation is of a permissive kind where the permission does not have to coincide temporally with the release of the hostages. In fact, the permission may take place during the morning and the actual release at a later time. Another possible interpretation is that the permission is not directly communicated to the hostages, but is given to a mediator in a negotiation.

The conceptual differences noted in examples (27-28) seem to corroborate the idea that finite complements are not very appropriate to code direct causation. Undeniably, the insertion of a finite complement in these cases gives rise to interpretations that involve two different events – and indirect causation. The finite cases exposed below (29-32) seem to share this feature:

(29) Tudo isto se reflectia no conjunto e **deixava que a degradação se apoderasse** dele pouco a pouco. [http://www.mosteirojeronimos.pt/web_mosteiro_jeronimos/html/cons _retabulo.html]

(30) Os portugueses têm a estranha e deplorável mania de **deixarem que os outros tomem** decisões por si. [sic.sapo.pt/online/noticias/opiniao/20061023+-+Aborto.htm]

(31) A subida nos preços dos combustíveis **fez com que a cidade em peso se tenha transferido** por algumas horas para as bombas de gasolina [*Linguateca:* Diário de Aveiro-N2461-2]

(32) Em 1926 fora escolhido, pela primeira vez, para Ministro das Finanças, mas um desentendimento com o primeiro-ministro da altura **fez com que se demitisse**. [http://www.arqnet.pt/portal/discursos/Abril 01.html]

The first two cases involve the structure *deixar + finite complement*. In (29), a prior event, described with the phrase "tudo isto", leads to the caused event of someone developing a strong feeling of humiliation. This transformation implies a mental act of thinking (or reasoning) that successively leads to the resulting state. In the second case (30), the most immediate interpretation is that the Portuguese people do not actively permit someone to make decisions concerning domestic matters. Actually, it seems more likely that the unwillingness to make any decision successively leads to the event of someone else doing so. This would imply two separate events: the Portuguese people's abstention from making a decision and the actual making of the same.

The following examples (31-32) with the verb *fazer + finite complement* share the conceptualization of two different events. In example (31), the

causing event of deciding to raise the price of petrol is followed by the caused event of buying petrol before the decision is put into effect. Undoubtedly, the decision made by the causee constitutes a mental process that is separate from that of deciding to raise the price. Likewise, (32) presents two distinguishable events: a misunderstanding between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance precedes a mental process in which the latter decides to resign.

The examples studied above certainly seem to express a causation that is somehow more indirect than is the case with the structure *main verb + infinitive complement*. In many cases, this indirect causation is manifested by a mental process. On the other hand, the structures with an infinitive complement seem to describe a causation that is more direct. In prototypical cases, this causation is of a physical nature, but it may also be of an emotional or perceptual kind. Underlying these differences is the conceptualization of the causing and the caused event as a single event with a spatiotemporal overlap or, in the indirect cases, the conception of two separate events. Thus, a question that remains is why infinitive complements seem more accurate in the coding of direct causation while finite complements are more appropriate for coding indirect causation.

A plausible answer to this question may be found in the semantics of the infinitive and the subjunctive. It is a well known fact that a typical feature of the infinitive is the absence of [tense/mood]. Further, the lack of this feature contributes to the nominal, holistic and non-temporal character of this verb form (Langacker, 1987). As a consequence of this feature, the infinitive complement fails to create a relation between the described event and the ground. The conceptualizer is not able to connect the event described by the infinitive complement in relation to the ground. By contrast, the subjunctive inflexion does present the feature [tense/mood]. Therefore, it creates a connection between the ground and the event it describes.[10] This difference is illustrated in Figure 5:

[10] See Maldonado (1995) and Vesterinen (2006, 2007) for discussions on the semantics of the subjunctive. In these studies, it is claimed that the subjunctive gives a lesser degree of *control* over the event described by the complement. Even if this issue is highly relevant in relation to the semantics of subjunctive complements, it goes beyond the scope of the present paper.



Figure 5. The relation between the ground and the linguistic expression.

Consequently, the event described with an infinitive complement (5a) is reached through the main verb and the whole structure *main verb + infinitive complement* codes a single complex event, illustrated by the dotted line that goes from the ground (G) to the infinitive complement *through* the main verb. This situation is closely related to the scale of *event integration* developed by Givón (1993, 2001). According to this scale a complement that is formally simple, and is lacking in morphological information, tends to be integrated in the event described by the main verb. On the other hand, a more elaborated complement gains a certain independence in its relation with the main verb and may be conceptualized as an event on its own (i.e. 5b). This connection is illustrated with the dotted line that goes from the ground to the finite complement.

These differences point to an iconic relation between finite/infinitive complements and the causation they describe with the verbs *deixar* and *fazer*. In the infinitive cases, a minor formal distance between the main verb and the complement coincides with a more direct causation. This correspondence is particularly salient in examples like (20) and (21) that describe direct physical causation. The finite complements, by contrast, often code an indirect mental causation. This is certainly the case in (29-32) above. This indirectness of causation is accompanied by a complement exhibiting a high degree of formal distance to the main verb. In addition, the formal complexity of the finite complement is matched with conceptual complexity, describing a causation of a mental kind.

The explanation given in Figure 5 can also account for another issue related to the finite and the infinitive complements of *deixar* and *fazer*.

Starting with the infinitive complements, the examples studied above show a correspondence in the sense that they often describe events that are visible in the outside world. This feature is compatible with prototypical direct physical causation. Conversely, the causation coded by finite complements frequently seems to be of a mental kind: first, the causee is induced to carry out a certain action or goes through a mental process that leads to a final state; second, it is the conceptualizer who relates two independent events that do not actually have to occur simultaneously in the outside world. In fact, he infers a causal relation between two events. Let us consider an example:

(33) As magníficas condições naturais do concelho de Lagos **fizeram com que desde cedo fosse povoado.** [http://www.olhao.net/algarve/lagos.htm]

In (33), the beautiful nature of Lagos is said to explain the reason why the region became inhabited. This causal chain implies a mental process in the causees (the settlers). That is, they were considering the pros and cons of the territory; and finally they decided to settle there. This causal chain may very well be true, but the issue at stake is that it is the conceptualizer who construes this relation. He is linking the beautiful nature of Lagos to the fact that people populated the area. This question will be studied in the subsequent section.

2.2 Inferred causation

The following occurrences with the structure *deixar + finite complement* illustrate the inferential character commonly shared by many finite cases. It is noteworthy that the examples present a causal relation that is not entirely overt. Rather, they display a mental and/or "fuzzy" causation. Let us consider some cases:

(34) Às vezes as pessoas **deixam que os mesmos problemas as tornem** infelizes por anos... [http://oqueha hoje.blogspot.com/]

(35) São pessoas que **deixam que as coisas lhes aconteçam**, em vez de assumirem o controlo da situação [http://www.maxima.pt/feminino/actriz.shtml]

(36) Seus parentes e antigos proprietários **deixaram que** a caldeira se entulhasse, que a casa da azenha se destelhasse e ficassem apenas as paredes em pé. [*Linguateca*: Diário de Aveiro-N0470-1]

The common denominator of the cases above is that they refer to a kind of causation that is not easily detected in the outside world. In (34), the relation is that of problems leading to unhappiness. Obviously, this causal relation is totally opposed to direct physical causation where cause and effect are clearly visible. Also, it is not true that problems automatically lead to a state of

unhappiness. In fact, many problems are challenging and stimulating. Therefore, it seems that it is the conceptualizer who infers a causal relation where problems lead to unhappiness. The same is true for the following case (35). The conceptualizer construes a causal relation where some people mentally, probably in a subconscious way, allow bad things to happen to them. What seems to be the issue, then, is that he connects a mental state to the occurrence of bad things happening. Finally, the conceptualizer of (36) connects the former owners of a house to the actual state of the same. This connection implies a mental operation where the conceptualizer compares the actual state of the house with its prior one. Thereafter, he infers that the former owners are responsible for the current condition of the house.

Turning to finite complements with the main verb *fazer*, it is noteworthy that the same tendency witnessed above prevails. The structure *fazer* + *finite complement* often describes mental causal relations that, on the whole, are inferred by the conceptualizer. That is to say, the conceptualizer infers that an event creates a mental process in the causee and makes him do something or feel in a particular way:

(37) Temos três factores: pinhal, praia e mar, que **fazem com que milhares de pessoas nos visitem** durante todo o ano [*Linguateca*: Diário de Aveiro-N3754-1]

(38) O facto de jogarmos com a Naval, atendendo à proximidade geográfica e alguma rivalidade existente, **faz com que os jogadores tenham** alguma ansiedade. [*Linguateca*: Diário de Coimbra-N0685-1]

(39) O aumento do contacto com cenas violentas **faz com que a criança reaja** mais tardiamente a pedir ajuda ou a intervir para apaziguar uma luta entre outras crianças. [http://www.medicosdeportugal.iol.pt/action/2/cnt_id/72/]

The first case (37) is akin to (33), describing a causation where people are attracted to a certain place. In this particular case, the beauty and pleasure of the pines, the beach and the sea creates a mental process in the causee and as a final result he decides to visit the place. It is interesting to note, however, that there may be many reasons to visit a certain place but, in this case, the conceptualizer connects the three factors mentioned above to the causee's action. In the subsequent case (38), the conceptualizer infers the cause to the player's anxiety from the fact that they will meet a certain team. Finally, in example (39), a connection is created between children's increasing contact with violent movies (or scenes) and a loss of empathy towards victims of authentic violence in the outside world.

The cases analysed so far (34-39) indicate that many cases with finite complements describe a mental kind of causation where the conceptualizer is the one who construes a causal relation. On the other hand, the infinitive

complements (20-26) describe direct physical, perceptual or emotional causation that can be seen in the outside world: the player kicks the ball, a subject sees something and a certain event creates emotions. As emphasized above, this tendency is a consequence of the iconic character of language where formal differences reflect conceptual ones. The conceptual differences pointed out so far may also be explained by a higher degree of subjectification in the structure *main verb + finite complement*. This issue will be addressed more in detail in the following section.

2.3 Subjectification

As alluded to in 1.2., subjectification is defined as the process in which meaning becomes increasingly based in the speaker's personal beliefs (Traugott, 1989) or as semantic bleaching where objective movement is replaced by the mental scanning of a subjectively construed conceptualizer, i.e. the ground (Langacker, 2006). Indeed, both these definitions seem to cover the inferred causation attested in examples (34-39) where the causal relation is construed by the conceptualizer. This is also true for the following examples:

(40) Os homens encolhem os ombros e **deixam que elas decidam** – como se não fossem necessários uma mulher e um homem para gerar uma nova vida [sic.sapo.pt/on-line/noticias/opiniao/20061023+-+ Aborto.htm]

(41) Sem desejos, motivações ou força de carácter, Wanda **deixa que o marido peça o divórcio e fique** com a custódia dos filhos. [http://www.uzimagazine.com/artigos _2. php?id=24]

(42) O excesso de poder **faz com que sejam** arrogantes no trato, refere, antes de deixar bem claro o seu repúdio por qualquer ligação a um cargo político-autárquico [Diário de Aveiro-N3945-6]

(43) A corrida desenfreada à ascensão económica…**fez com que os bairros de Lisboa se esfumassem** [http://www.terranatal.com/notic/cronicas/c_lr_1.htm]

In the first two examples with the permissive/enabling verb *deixar* (40--41), the conceptualizer explains the caused event with a "mental" event. In (40), men's general lack of interest in the abortion question gives room for the women to decide whether they should have an abortion or not. In the following example (41), the mental state of "Wanda" is said to explain why she lets her husband divorce her and take custody of the children. In the following cases with the verb *fazer*, the arrogance demonstrated by politicians in (42) is due to an excess of power, while the actual state of the quarters of Lisbon in (43) is a result of economic overheating. Needless to say, it is the conceptualizer who construes these causal relations.

Thus, the examples studied above fit extremely well in Traugott's Tendency 1 and 3. Firstly, the causation expressed is not actually based in an external situation, but rather in an internal (evaluative) one. That is to say, the causation is not to be seen in the outside world. On the contrary, it is the conceptualizer who relates two events in order to explain the caused event. This situation is totally opposed to physical direct causation where cause and effect correlate in the outside world. Secondly, by creating a causal relation, the conceptualizer presents his own personal beliefs about cause and effect in the outside world. This situation reflects Tendency 3 in the sense that the linguistic expression is based in the speaker's subjective and personal beliefs.

Turning to subjectification in the Langackerian sense, it is interesting to note that the internal evaluation of a situation, in this particular case the relation between cause and effect, presupposes mental scanning. In order to detect the cause of a particular event, the conceptualizer scans mentally between two events that might be – but do not have to be – connected in a causal relation. Indeed, the mental character of inferred causation implies that the events might not even be visible in the outside world. In direct causation, by contrast, this scanning involves a complex event and a causal force that is actually perceived in the outside world. The difference is illustrated in Figure 6:



A. Direct causation B. Inferred causation

C = causer
C´= inferred causer
c = causee

Figure 6. Inferred causation and subjectification.

As indicated in Figure 6a, the direct causation tends to display objective movement, i.e. a perceivable causal force (illustrated by the arrow going from the causer to the causee). Being so, the conceptualizer, equated with the ground,

scans this causal force and detects a causal relation. Undeniably, this is the case in direct physical causation where the causer manipulates an object in order to achieve the caused event. This is also the case when the causation is of a direct visual-emotional kind. The causing and the caused events coincide as a complex event in the outside world – here and now – and the conceptualizer is able to verify the causal force. Conversely, in the inferred causation (6b), objective movement is replaced by the conceptualizer's mental scanning (this connection is illustrated by the dotted arrow between (C´) and (c)). Hence, in terms of a causal force, there is no movement in the situation. The only movement is the mental scanning of the conceptualizer, the participant who is creating a causal relation between two different events. This situation is equated with subjectification in the Langackerian framework. It also entails a shift in the locus of activity: the mental scanning of the conceptualizer gives him an active role as the "originator" of the causal relation.

The notion of subjectification raises another question. The examples analysed in this paper, suggest there to be an inferential feature in the indirect causation. Even so, many cases of indirect causation describe a situation that implies objective movement. In (28), for example, i.e. "Monteiro fez com que a bola entrasse", it was argued that a finite complement is possible if the trajector (Monteiro) actively prevents the goalkeeper from reaching the ball. In the same manner, (43) exemplifies metaphorical movement: "the race towards economic overheating". Thus, the question is if these cases pertain to Langacker's notion of subjectification.

Unquestionably, this is a complex issue. Nonetheless, it is essential to make a distinction between objective movement in a causing event, on the one hand, and causal relations, on the other. The main point is that it is the conceptualizer who construes a causal relation in examples like (28) and (43). In the former case, he infers that "Monteiro" contributes to the goal, but a more direct cause is to be found in the manipulation of the ball. In fact, the action performed by "Monteiro" might not even contribute to the caused event. The latter case shares the feature of mental scanning between two events. Further, the conceptualizer describes movement metaphorically in an event where objective movement is lacking.

The difference attested in the cases above substantiate the idea that subjectification is to be understood as a gradual phenomenon. The cases that give evidence of objective motion in the described event can easily be considered as cases of subjectification since the inferential character implies that it is the conceptualizer who is responsible for creating a causal relation. A subsequent step in this process is the total lack of objective movement in the described event. The lack of objective movement – and the fact that the conceptualizer is fully responsible for creating a causal relation – amounts to a higher degree of subjectification. Needless to say, the gradual character of subjectification is unproblematic from a Cognitive Grammar perspective, a

framework that acknowledges the difficulty to posit sharp and absolute boundaries between different categories.

3. Conclusion

The present paper has shown that the existence of two different complement structures with the causation verbs *deixar* and *fazer* in European Portuguese is highly motivated by the conceptual differences that these structures display. In prototypical cases, the structure *main verb + infinitive complement* is used to code direct causation. Conversely, the structure *main verb + finite complement* designates indirect causation. Furthermore, the finite structures often describe an inferred causation where the conceptualizer is responsible for construing a causal relation between two different events.

A plausible explanation to these differences has been given: the affirmation that language is iconic in nature. In the first place, the coding of direct causation with infinitive complements is an outcome of the minor formal distance between the main verb and the complement verb. Accordingly, indirect causation, attested in the finite complements, is a direct result of a greater formal distance between the two verbs. In the second place, a higher degree of formal complexity in the finite complements reflects a higher degree of conceptual complexity. By this fact, the structure *main verb + finite complement* designates a more indirect causation, often with inferential features.

This conceptual complexity has been explained by a higher degree of subjectification in the structure *main verb + finite complement*. Starting with the notion of subjectification as it is understood by Traugott (1989), the causation designated by the structure with a finite complement is based in an internal and evaluative description of causal relations. Thus, the structure *main verb + finite complement* describes the speaker's subjective and personal opinion about causal relations in the outside world. From a Langackerian point of view, the inferred causation entails that objective movement is replaced by the conceptualizer's mental scanning. Further, it is the conceptualizer who construes a causal force that is said to explain the occurrence of the event described in the finite complement.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Swedish Graduate School in Romance Languages (FoRom). I wish to express my gratitude to Manne Bylund, Johan Falk and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper; and to John Farrow and Gary Watson for correcting my English writing. Any remaining errors or inconsistencies are strictly my own.

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